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INTRODUCTION
As a reflection of society itself, the sports world has become a battle ground
where those who seek access to sports participation use laws of general
application to make their inroad into sports. 1 Title IX and the Civil Rights laws
are particular examples of this phenomenon. However, possibly no area has
provided more debate and litigation than the participation of disabled athletes in
sports.
National attention has been focused on this area in 1998 through the example
of Casey Martin. A friendly and talented young man, Martin needed an
accommodation in order to participate in PGA Tour events and sued for the right
to use a golf cart. His lawsuit demonstrated the power that the Americans With
Disabilities Act ("ADA") possesses in changing the way that sports are played.
In reaction to this lawsuit, many in the sports world have assumed that all
sports have now become open to similar attacks and that, therefore, the games
we have all come to know and love will be forever changed. This article will
assess this fear. It will attempt to reflect on the ADA's impact at all levels of
sport, and then use the Casey Martin case as an example of what can be expected
from litigation in the future.
Part I will provide a brief description and history of the ADA. Part II will
catalog the ADA's impact at all levels of sport from interscholastic athletics, to
the National Collegiate Athletic Association, to professional and other sports,
and to its impact in the very facilities in which sports are played. Part III will
discuss the Casey Martin case and subsequent litigation in response to that case.
Part IV will then conclude with an analysis of the impact that the ADA really has
on the sports arena in order to then answer the question "Does the ADA change
the rules of sport?"
1. THE ADA: AN OVERVIEW
The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 was passed with the purpose
of "providing a 'clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.' 2  While an in-depth
i. For a strong series of articles by one author discussing the issues involved in disabled athletes'
participation in sports, see Matthew J. Mitten, Amateur Athletes With Handicaps or Physical
Abnormalitiesi Who Makes the Participation Decision?, 71 Neb. L. Rev. 987 (1992), Enhanced Risk
of Harm to One's Self as a Justification for Exclusion From Athletics, 8 Marq. Sports L. J. 189 (1998);
Sports Participation by "Handicapped" Athletes, 10 Ent. & Sports L. 15 (1992).
2. Julia V. Kasperski, Disabled High School Athletes and the Right to Participate: Are Age Waivers
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analysis of the ADA and its history are not necessary,3 a basic understanding of
the ADA is necessary in order to understand its impact on the sports world.
It is important to note that the ADA is to be read in conjunction with the
Rehabilitation Act of 19734 ("Rehabilitation Act") which prohibits
discrimination against the disabled by government agencies who receive federal
funds.5
The first inquiry under the ADA is whether a person is "disabled" as defined
in the statute. Under the ADA a person is disabled if he or she:
(A) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) has a record of such impairment; or
(C) is regarded as having such an impairment. 6
To understand this definition of disabled, two other particular definitions are
also necessary. First, a "physical or mental impairment" is:
(i) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including
speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine;
(ii) Any mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 7
Second, a "major life activity" is defined as "functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working." 8 In determining whether an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity, the following factors should be taken into
Reasonable Modifications Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act?, 49
Baylor L. Rev. 175, 182 (1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994)).
3. For further analysis of the ADA, see Ruth Colker, The Law of Disability Discrimination: Cases
and Materials (1995); Wayne L. Anderson & Mary Lizabeth Roth, Deciphering the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 51 J. Mo. B. 142 (1995); Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., An Overview of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 38 No. 7 Prac. Law. 21 (1992); Edward J. McGraw, Compliance Costs of the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 521 (1993).
4. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973). For a good article discussing this relationship, see Mark
R. Lyberger & Donna L. Pastore, Section 504 and the ADA: Past, Present and Future, 7 J. Legal
Aspects of Sport 105 (1997). See also U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Disability
Rights Section, A Guide to Disability Rights Laws (1996) (for an agency overview of the many laws
that protect the rights of the disabled).
5. Katie M. Burroughs, Learning Disabled Student Athletes: A Sporting Chance Under The ADA?,
14 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 57, 63 (1997).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(1994).
7. 28C.F.R. §36.104(1)(1998).
s. Id. § 36.104(2).
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account:
1. The nature and severity of the impairment;
2. The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
3. The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long
term impact, of or resulting from the impairment. 9
After a determination that a person is disabled under these definitions, the
analysis then shifts to the particular Title of the ADA which will be found to
apply.
A. Title I10
Title I of the ADA applies to employment situations. Basically, Title I
applies to private employers, state and local governments, employment agencies,
and labor unions with fifteen or more employees.11 Title I mandates that "[n]o
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." 12 In order to hold an employer liable under Title I, an individual
must first show that he is disabled, i.e. the individual "has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a
record of such impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment." 13
Once the person is shown to be disabled, he must then demonstrate that he is
a "qualified individual with a disability" and that he is "a person who meets
legitimate skill, experience, education, or other requirements of an employment
position that [he] holds or seeks, and who can perform the 'essential functions'
of the position with or without reasonable accommodation. '14 Accommodations
for "qualified individuals" are made after taking into consideration the "undue
hardship" that an employer may suffer as measured by the administrative cost,
financial burden, and nature of the accommodation, among other factors. 15
Such accommodations are only undertaken if they are "reasonable
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii)(2) (1990).
to. 42 U.S.C § 12111-12117(1994).
I. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & US. Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Questions And Answers (May 1997).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
13. Questions and Answers, supra note 11, at 1.
14. Id. at2.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A-B).
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accommodations."1 6 A "reasonable accommodation" is "any modification or
adjustment to a job or the work environment that will enable a qualified
applicant or employee with a disability to participate in the application process
or to perform essential job functions." 17
Because Title I applies only to employment situations, it has not yet been
adjudicated in the, context of interscholastic or intercollegiate athletic
situations. 18 It is clear that Title I could apply in the professional sports context,
although at present, no case has been brought making this allegation.
B. Title H19
Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 2 0 A "public entity" for purposes
of Title I1 includes a State or local government or "any department, agency,
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local
government." 2 1  Title II covers actions of such a "public entity" which
discriminates against "qualified individual[s] with a disability ... who, with or
without reasonable modifications to rules policies, or practices ... meet[- the
essential eligibility requirements for receipt of services or the participation in
16. Questions and Answers, supra note 11, at 5; For a more in depth analysis of the ADA's
reasonable accommodation requirements, see Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable
Accommodation Under the Americans With Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before
Hardship Turns Undue?, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1311 (1991).
17. Questions and Answers, supra note 11, at 5.
is. This could change in the future if scholarship student-athletes come to be considered employees
of the universities they attend as discussed by several scholars. For example, see Charlotte M. Rasche,
Note, Can Universities Afford to Pay for Play? A Look at Vicarious Liability Implications of
Compensating Student Athletes, 16 Rev. Litig. 219 (1997); Sean Alan Roberts, Symposium: The
Lawyer's Duties and Liabilities to Third Parties: Comment, College Athletes, Universities, and
Workers' Compensation: Placing the Relationship in the Proper Context by Recognizing Scholarship
Athletes as Employees, 37 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1315 (1996); David W. Woodburn, Comment, College
Athletes Should Be Entitled to Workers' Compensation For Sports-Related Injuries: A Request to
Broaden the Definition of Employee Under Ohio Revised Code Section 4123.01, 28 Akron L. Rev.
611 (1995).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12131-12165 (1994). See also, U.S. Department of Justice, The Americans With
Disabilities Act Title II Technical Assistance Manual: Covering State and Local Government
Programs and Services (November 1993).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
21. Id. § 12131(I)(A-B).
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programs or activities provided by a public entity."'22
As one commentator has noted, "[c]ourts have construed programs, like state
athletic associations, as instrumentalities of the state, thus, a public entity under
the ADA, because public schools delegate extensive authority to these athletic
associations."'23 Student-athletes are able to make claims under Title II by
showing that (1) the association or school is a public entity, (2) the student is a
"qualified individual with a disability," (3) the student has been excluded from
participation in or denied the benefits of the activities of the public entity, and (4)
"reasonable accommodations could be made which do not fundamentally alter
the nature of [the association's] accommodations. '24
The specific ways in which a court will analyze a claim by a student-athlete
under Title II will become clearer in the cases described below.
C. Title 11125
Soon after the passage of the ADA, commentators noted that Title II
"created more conflicts in implementation than any other aspect of the ADA." 26
Title III is the section of the ADA that is most often applicable in sports related
cases. It provides that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation. '2 7
Title III specifically mentions twelve private entities that are considered
public accommodations for purposes of the title.28 "A gymnasium ... golf
course, or other place of exercise or recreation,"'29 as used by a sporting
organization, are specifically included as places of public accommodation.
Title III prohibits various types of discrimination against disabled
individuals based on their disability, including: denial of participation; 30
22. Id. § 12131(2).
23. Burroughs, supra note 5, at 64 (referring to many of the cases which will be discussed herein).
24. Kasperski, supra note 2, at 182-184.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12181-12189 (1994). See also U.S. Department of Justice, The Americans With
Disabilities Act Title Ill Technical Assistance Manual: Covering Public Accommodations and
Commercial Facilities (November 1993).
26. John W. Parry, Public Accommodation Under the Americans With Disabilities Act:
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability, 16 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 92 (1992).
27. 42 U.SC. § 12182(a).
28. Seeid. § 12181(7)(A-L).
29. Id. § 12181(7)(L).
30. Id. § 12182(b)(l)(AXi).
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participation that is not equal to that afforded individuals without disabilities; 3 1
participation in separate benefits; 32 screening of individuals with disabilities
from enjoyment of the goods and services of the place of public
accommodation; 33 a failure to make reasonable modifications unless such
modifications would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the goods and services
of the place of public accommodation; 34 exclusion due to an absence of auxiliary
aids and services for the disabled;3 5 and failure to remove structural and other
facility barriers to disabled individuals. 36
II. THE ADA AS APPLIED TO SPORTS
It may come as a surprise to many sports fans that since its inception in
1990, the ADA has been applied to the sports world in many different areas. For
purposes of organization, this analysis of the ADA's impact on the sports world
will be separated into five distinct areas: (1) interscholastic sports; (2)
intercollegiate sports (the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"));
(3) other non-professional sports; (4) professional sports; and (5) sports facility
cases.
As the ADA has been found to apply in different ways at these different
levels of sports participation, a true understanding of the ADA's impact on sports
is best gained by analyzing the cases themselves.
A. Interscholastic Sports
Some of the first cases that applied the ADA to sports dealt with the right of
a disabled individual to participate in sports at the high school or interscholastic
level. This area has been thoroughly covered in the scholarly literature and any
detailed analysis would thus be repetitious here. 37 Still, the important cases
31. Id. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(ii).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(iii).
33. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
34. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(AXii).
35. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
36. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(AXiv).
37. For example, see Adam A. Milani, Can I Play?: The Dilemma of the Disabled Athlete in
Interscholastic Sports, 49 Ala. L. Rev. 817 (1998); Kasperski, supra note 2; Edmund J. Sikorski,
Disability Litigation Leads to Appellate Rights For Athletic Associations in the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, 8(5) For The Record 6 (Oct./Nov. 1997); John T. Wolohan, The Americans With Disabilities
Act and Its Effect on High School Athletic Associations' Age Restrictions, 106 Educ. Law Rep. 971
(1996); Jason L. Thomas, Casenote, Through the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, High School
Athletes Are Saying "Put Me In Coach;" Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass 'n, 64 F.3d
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must be discussed in order to have a basic understanding of the ADA's
application to interscholastic sports. 38
In general, cases at the interscholastic level have dealt with eligibility
questions brought by a disabled athlete who was barred from participation by an
age eligibility rule of some sort.39 The rationale behind these rules is that older
athletes, by the nature of being more physically mature, could pose a safety
hazard to other athletes who may be smaller and less physically mature. Since
courts have consistently held that participation in interscholastic athletics is not a
property right,40 claimants have argued that under the ADA they have a right to
participate if barring them from such participation is discriminatory.
Disabled athletes are denied from participation in athletics by these rules
because their disability has forced them to take longer in school to meet
academic or other requirements. In essence, then, "[s]tudents who are excluded
from interscholastic sports because of their age, and who are overage because of
disabilities, may argue that they effectively have been discriminated against
because of their disabilities, and they may seek injunctive relief to force sports
associations or school officials to allow them to play." 4 1  Therefore, these
student-athletes sue the rule-making body alleging that the rules used against
them are in violation of the ADA. 42
It must also be noted that most of these interscholastic cases have not dealt
with final decisions on the merits of the case brought. Instead, as one
commentator has noted, "court decisions have generally addressed the question
1026 (6th Cir. 1995), 65 U. Cin. L. Rev. 727 (1997); John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity, Under
Rehabilitation Act or Americans With Disabilities Act, of Rules or Laws Limiting Participation in
Interscholastic Sports to Those Below Specified Age, 143 A.L.R. Fed. 567 (1998).
38. The cases discussed in this section will be those decided at the appellate level as higher court
decisions regarding these matters. For a thorough listing of cases decided at any judicial level, see
Theuman, supra note 37. Examples of cases at lower levels are Rhodes v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 939 F. Supp. 584 (N.D. Ohio 1996); Reaves v. Mills, 904 F. Supp. 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); Hoot
v. Milan Area Schs., 853 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
39. These rules come in many forms but typically can be categorized as eight-semester rules which
limit participation in athletics for high school students to the eight semesters of their attendance of
school or as age-limit rules which limit participation in high school sports to students who are eighteen
or younger.
40. See, e.g., Allen L. Sack et al.., Sports Law 33 (1986); J. Staurowsky, College Athletes For Hire:
The Evolution and Legacy of the NCAA's Amateur Myth (1998); Eric J. Sobocinski, College
Athletes: What is Fair Compensation?, 7 Marq. Sports LJ. 257-94 (1996).
41. Theuman, supra note 37, at 574-75.
42. It must be noted at this point that many of these cases also involve claims under the
Rehabilitation Act. However, since the ADA was modeled after and follows the Rehabilitation Act as
already discussed, for purposes of this article the case discussions will focus only on claims brought
under the ADA.
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[of] whether the plaintiffs had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits and had met the other requirements for preliminary injunctive relief."43
1. Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Association44
The first federal circuit court to make a decision concerning such eligibility
rules was the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Leo Pottgen was a baseball
player at Hancock High School in Missouri. As a result of a learning disability,
Pottgen was forced to repeat two grades in elementary school so that by the time
he reached his senior year in high school he was nineteen years old. Due to his
age, Pottgen was restricted from playing during his senior year by a Missouri
State High School Activities Association ("MSHSAA") By-Law which restricted
the participation in interscholastic athletics of students who had reached the age
of nineteen "prior to July 1 preceding the opening of school."'45  Pottgen
appealed to the MSHSAA to waive the rule and allow him to participate, but his
appeal was denied.4 6 Pottgen then sued the MSHSAA claiming that the rule's
application to him was a violation of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. The
district court granted Pottgen a preliminary injunction which enjoined the
MSHSAA from preventing him from participating in baseball and from
imposing any penalties on any schools for or against which he played.47
On appeal, Pottgen did not have similar success. The Eighth Circuit found
that Pottgen was not an "otherwise qualified individual" under either the ADA or
the Rehabilitation Act.4 8 In analyzing Pottgen's claim under the ADA, the
Eighth Circuit focused on Title II's definition of a "qualified individual with a
disability." 49 In deciding that Pottgen was not "otherwise qualified," the court
first determined that the age limit rule was "an essential eligibility requirement
of the interscholastic baseball program," basically due to health and safety
concerns as already discussed.50
The court then looked to the "reasonableness" of any modification to the
eligibility rule, focusing on whether the modification would impose an "undue
financial and administrative burden" or whether it would require a "fundamental
alteration" in the nature of the program.5 1 In this case, because the court had
43. Theuman, supra note 37, at 575.
44. 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
45. Id. at 928.
46. See Wolohan, supra note 37, at 975.
47. Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 857 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
48. Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 929-30.
49. Id. at 930.
5o. Id. at931.
51. Id.
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found that the rule was "essential," modification of the rule was not a reasonable
modification as required under the ADA. 52 Thus, Pottgen's claim could not
succeed.
2. Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, Inc. 53
Ronald G. Sandison and Craig M. Stanley were senior student-athletes at
Adams High School and Gross Pointe North High School, respectively, in
Michigan. 54 These two student-athletes were also learning disabled, causing
each to be two years behind his class in high school so that each boy was
nineteen years old during his senior year. 55 Due to a Michigan High School
Athletic Association ("MHSAA") regulation, both Sandison and Stanley were
thus restricted from participating in athletics during their senior years. 56
The plaintiffs sued the MHSAA and the two school districts under the ADA
(Title II and Title IIl) and the Rehabilitation Act (among other claims) claiming
that the rule barring them from participation discriminated against them due to
their disabilities. The district court granted the plaintiffs' temporary restraining
orders barring the defendants from interfering with their participation in
athletics. 57
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit initially held that the MHSAA was not a "place
of public accommodation" covered by Title Ill of the ADA. The Court reached
this conclusion because the plaintiffs had alleged that they were being denied
access to public school grounds and public parks which were not operated by
private entities. 58
As to the plaintiffs' claim under Title II, the Sixth Circuit, like the Eighth
Circuit, focused on the "qualified individual with a disability" language.59 As
the court discussed, a plaintiff suing under Title II must "prove that the exclusion
from participation in the program was 'solely by reason of [disability].' 60 In
this case, "[a]bsent their respective learning disability [sic], the plaintiffs still
would not meet the age restriction."'6 1 Therefore, "[r]equiring waiver of the age
restriction ... would fundamentally change the currently bright-line age
52. Id.
53. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
54. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 863 F. Supp. 483, 485 (ED. Mich. 1994).
55. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1028.
56. Id. at 1029.
57. Sandison, 863 F. Supp. at 491.
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restriction," 62 and would be an unreasonable modification that the court could
not require.
In the end as the court stated, "[t]he plaintiffs' respective learning disability
does not prevent the two students from meeting the age requirement; the passage
of time does."'63
3. Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc.64
David Dennin was a mentally retarded student-athlete at Trumbull High
School in Connecticut. Similar to the previous cases, David entered his senior
year of high school at the age of nineteen because he was forced to enroll in four,
rather than three, years of Middle School.65 Therefore, David was barred from
full participation in the Trumbull swim team by the Connecticut Interscholastic
Athletic Conference's ("CIAC") maximum age eligibility rule.66 David's parents
sued the CIAC for a waiver of the rule.
In district court the Dennins won an injunction which prevented CIAC from
denying David a waiver of the maximum-age eligibility rule because David was
an otherwise qualified individual who was discriminated against solely by reason
of his disability and who, with reasonable accommodation (a waiver) by the
CIAC, could meet the essential requirements of the athletic program despite his
disability. 67 In essence Dennin was unable to meet the eligibility criteria directly
because it discriminated against him due to his disability. 68
Unfortunately, for purposes of further comparison to the other cases, the
Second Circuit held that the CIAC's appeal was moot because David had
participated under the injunction and subsequently graduated.69 As a result the
appellate court did not reach the merits of Dennin's ADA claim.
4. Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Association, Inc. 70
In a case surprisingly similar to the Dennin case, Dennis Johnson was barred
from competition in his senior year due to an age requirement. Johnson entered
his senior year at the age of nineteen and was barred by a Florida High School
Activities Association ("FHSAA") By-Law that restricted participation above
62. Id. at 1037.
63. Id. at 1033.
64. 94 F.3d 96 (2nd Cir. 1996).
65. Id. at 99.
66. Id.
67. Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 913 F. Supp. 663, 669-671 (D. Conn.
1996), vacated, 94 F.3d 96 (2nd Cir. 1996).
6s. Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 669.
69. Dennin, 94 F.3d at 101; Sikorski, supra note 37, at 6.
70. 102 F.3d 1172 (1lth Cir. 1997).
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the age of eighteen. 7 1 Johnson then sued the FHSAA under the Rehabilitation
Act and ADA claiming that the age limitation was discriminatory.
The district court initially found that the FHSAA was a "public entity" as
regulated by the ADA and that Johnson was a "qualified individual with a
disability." 72  According to the district court, the "dispositive issue ... is
whether waiving the age requirement constitutes a 'fundamental alteration' to the
purposes of the rule." 73
In deciding this issue, the district court specifically criticized the Pottgen
court, noting that it blindly accepted the MSHSAA's assertion that its age
regulation was essential and so a modification of the rule would consequently be
a fundamental alteration. 74 The court then followed the decision in Sandison
and looked behind any blind assertion of the essential nature of the age rule to
"the relationship between the age requirement and its purposes."' 75 The district
court held that "the purposes of the age requirement are not undermined by
allowing [Johnson] to participate in interscholastic athletics." 76 As Johnson was
not a star player, his participation would not be an unreasonable modification of
the age rule aimed at keeping larger, more experienced players from playing in
order to promote the safety of other participants.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit (similar to the Second Circuit) held that the
issue was moot because Johnson had already participated under the injunction. 77
5. McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, Inc. 78
Another case involving the MHSAA focused on the association's eight
semester rule. In McPherson, despite the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Sandison, the
district court issued a preliminary injunction which allowed McPherson to
participate in athletics during his senior year even though such participation was
during McPherson's ninth and tenth semesters of enrollment in excess of the
eight semesters normally allowed. 79
After the Rehearing En Banc, the Sixth Circuit made several important
71. Id.at1173.
72. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 583-584 (M.D. Fla. 1997),
vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11 th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1995).
73. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 584.
74. Id. at 585.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Johnson, 102 F.3d at 1173.
78. 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).
79. Id. at 458; McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 77 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 1996),
withdrawn and substituted by amended opinion, 90 F.3d 124 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 21412 (6th Cir. 1996).
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rulings. Initially, the court determined that the eight semester rule itself was a
"neutral rule" because, as the court had stated in Sandison, "[t]he plaintiff's
respective learning disability does not prevent [him] from meeting the...
requirement; the passage of time does."'80 Therefore, the court concluded that
under the ADA it had to determine "whether requiring the MHSAA to grant a
waiver would 'impose [ ] undue financial and administrative burdens.., or
require[ a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program,' 8 1 because, as
it had stated previously, "[w]aiver of a necessary requirement would [be] a
substantial rather than merely a reasonable accommodation. ' 82
In its final analysis the court concluded that waiver of the eight-semester rule
would "work a fundamental alteration in Michigan high school sports
programs, '83 because it would "impose an immense financial and administrative
burden on the MHSAA." 84
6. Conclusion
The cases dealing with the ADA and sports participation in high school
athletics do not provide consistent answers. According to the Eighth and Sixth
Circuits, the ADA cannot change age limitation rules of high school athletic
associations because that would constitute unreasonable modifications of
essential rules. The Second and Eleventh Circuits, while hearing similar cases,
made decisions based on mootness and not on the merits of the ADA claims.
Whether there are any general rules that can be gleaned from the previous
cases is questionable at best. What seems most prominent is that "[n]either the
ADA nor Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act mandates that an eligibility rule
be eliminated as an accommodation upon the assertion of disability on the part of
an aspiring player."8 5
It must be noted at this point that the cases dealing with interscholastic
athletics have dealt with eligibility rules, and not with the actual playing of any
8o. McPherson, 119 F.3d at 461 (quoting Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1033).
81. Id. (quoting Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1034 (quoting School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 287 n.17, (1987))).
82. Id. (quoting Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 575 (6th Cir. 1988))
(citation omitted).
83. Id. at 462.
84. Id. Soon after McPherson the Sixth Circuit followed its ruling in a similar case involving the
eight-semester rule. See Frye v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21071
(6th Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit has also dealt with a case involving a student who was declared
ineligible. See Fischbach v. New Mexico Activities Ass'n, 38 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 1994). The only
decision in this case was in regard to the mootness of the plaintiffs claim. Since no ADA claims were
addressed by the court, that decision is not discussed in this article.
8s. Sikorski, supra note 37, at 7.
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particular sport, as in the Casey Martin case. However, these cases are important
as they show that in high school athletics at least, if the rules are "fundamental"
to the sports program itself, the ADA will not necessarily cause them to be
modified.
B. The NCAA
Litigation by disabled student-athletes focusing on eligibility issues has also
found its way to the collegiate level. As the main body that regulates collegiate
athletics, the NCAA has found itself, and its eligibility requirements for athletic
participation, under a series of attacks. Many commentators have discussed
these attacks and the application of the disability rights law to the NCAA's
eligibility requirements. 86  Therefore, all that is necessary here is a brief
overview of the ADA's application to NCAA student-athletes and the rules of
the NCAA. 8
7
86. See Christopher W. Lewis, Athletic Eligibility - Too High a Hurdle for the Learning Disabled, 15
T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 75 (1998); Burroughs, supra note 5, at 65; Laura F. Rothstein, Higher Education
Law Symposium, Higher Education and Disabilities: Trends and Developments, 27 Stetson L. Rev.
119 (1997); Adam A. Milani, Disabled Students In Higher Education: Administrative and Judicial
Enforcement of Disability Law, 22 J.C. & U.L. 989 (1996); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Application of the
Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 504 to Colleges and Universities: An Overview and
Discussion of Special Issues Relating to Students, 23 J.C. & U.L. 1 (1996); Laura F. Rothstein,
College Students With Disabilities: Litigation Trends, 13 Rev. Litig. 425 (1994); John A. Reding &
Peter C. Meier, Athletes Cry 'Foul!' Over NCAA Rules, Law Journal! Sports & Entertainment Law,
(visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.ljx.conpractice/sports/lII7ncaa.html>; LD Athletes' Suits
Against NCAA Signal Trend For Disability Service Providers, Disability Compliance For Higher
Education, Vol. 3, No. 3, Oct. 1997; College Athletes With LD Attack NCAA's Initial Eligibility
Policy, Disability Compliance Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 3, July 31, 1997; What Should I Do If a Student
With a Disability Wishes to Compete in Athletics, Disability Compliance For Higher Education, Vol.
2, No. 7, Feb. 1997.
97. Again, the analysis will focus on the ADA and not the Rehabilitation Act. However, two cases
still bear mentioning which were actually brought against the NCAA focusing on the Rehabilitation
Act alone:
1) In Pahulu v. University of Kansas, 897 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995), a potential football player
brought suit against the University of Kansas for barring him from participation even though he
suffered from a condition which created a high risk that he would sustain a permanent and severe
neurological injury if he participated. Pahulu sued the University claiming that its decision not to
allow him to participate violated the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 1389. In using the "otherwise
qualified" language that was discussed earlier in this article, the court found that the University's
determination that Pahulu was not "otherwise qualified," due to his failure to meet the requirement of
gaining medical clearance to play was entirely reasonable and was not a violation of the Rehabilitation
Act. Id. at 1394.
2) In another highly publicized case, Nicholas Knapp, a potential college basketball player, sued
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As is obvious from the previous discussion focusing on interscholastic
athletes, some disabled students are forced to take remedial or other special
education courses in order to fulfill their requirements at the high school level.
Enrollment in these courses can also add to the length of time that a disabled
student-athlete takes to finish high school; therefore, these students are held out
of participation due to the age-limitation rules already discussed.
The NCAA's eligibility requirements for freshman student-athletes are
controlled by Section 14.3 of the NCAA Manual. 88 In general terms, eligibility
"depends upon a student's American College Testing ("ACT") or Scholastic
Aptitude Test ("SAT") scores, along with his or her high school grade point
average ("GPA")."89 The GPA itself is computed from "core courses" that are
approved by the NCAA. 90  "Special education and remedial courses are
expressly excluded from the NCAA eligibility formula." 9 1
Disabled student-athletes are often unable to meet NCAA initial eligibility
requirements because they were required to enroll in special education courses
which are not counted toward the NCAA's core requirements. 92 This is the
genesis of the lawsuits that will be discussed. As these student-athletes could not
meet NCAA initial eligibility requirements (i.e., they took courses that were
necessitated by their disability although not recognized as fulfilling the core
requirements of the NCAA), these student-athletes allege that the NCAA's
declaring them ineligible is a violation of the disability laws.
Northwestern University over its decision to bar him from participation. Knapp v. Northwestern
Univ., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). Prior to his senior year in high school, Knapp suffered a sudden
cardiac death during a pick-up game and was given an internal heart defibrillator as a result. Id. at
476. Northwestern had offered Knapp a basketball scholarship and assured him and his family that it
would be honored regardless of his medical condition. Id. Before Knapp could begin participation at
Northwestern, he was declared ineligible. Id. at 476-77. Knapp then sued under the Rehabilitation
Act to force Northwestern to allow him to participate. Id. at 477. Although the court's decision in this
case has been criticized, see Rothstein, Higher Education, supra note 86, at 132-33 (criticizing the
Knapp court for basing its holding on the fact that intercollegiate athletics are not a "major life
activity" and therefore do not warrant protection under the Act), for purposes of this article it is
important to note that in reversing the district court's decision, the Seventh Circuit held that "the
university has the right to determine that an individual is not otherwise medically qualified to play
without violating the Rehabilitation Act." Knapp, 101 F.3d at 484. Subsequently, the United States
Supreme Court refused to review the case. See No Court Action For Basketball Case, U.P.I., June 16,
1997, BC Cycle.
8s. 1997-98 NCAA Division I Manual, § 14.3, at 137-43.
89. Lewis, supra note 86, at 77 (citations omitted).
go. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 78.
HeinOnline  -- 1 Va. J. Sports & L. 59 1999
VOL. 1:1 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF SPORTS AND THE LAW SPRING 1999
1. Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Association93
The first case to really bring this issue into the forefront involved potential
NCAA swimmer Chad Ganden.94 Ganden has a learning disability that caused
him to take several remedial classes in high school specifically adapted to his
disability. 95 With this assistance and hard work, Ganden was able to reach a
cumulative GPA of 2.09 through high school. 9 6 However, this GPA level
required a compiled ACT score that Ganden was unable to achieve.9 7 Ganden
was also unable to reach the NCAA's mandated "core course" requirement. 98
Regardless of this fact, Michigan State University and several other colleges
recruited Ganden. 99
On behalf of Ganden, and with the support of the Justice Department, the
University sought a waiver from the NCAA's core course requirement. 100 The
waiver was denied. 10 1 Ganden then sued the NCAA claiming that its eligibility
criteria violated Title III of the ADA. 102
In assessing Ganden's motion for a preliminary injunction to allow him to
participate, the court began by noting that in order to be a "place of public
accommodation," a membership organization like the NCAA "must have a
'close connection to a particular facility.' 103 Such a connection will be found
93. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368 (N.D. I11. 1996).
94. For a more thorough analysis of the Ganden case, see W.S. Miller, Ganden v. NCAA: How the
NCAA's Efforts to Clean Up Its Image Have Created an Ethical and Legal Dilemma, 7 Marq. Sports
L. J. 465 (1997).
95. Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *2.
96. Id. at *2-3.
97. Id. at *6.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *7.
jo0. Id. at *7-11. Another similar dispute involves Shawn Farestar, a kicker who attempted to enroll
at Division I1 Edinboro. Farestar was granted "partial qualifier" status (as described in note 101) as he
was unable to meet all of the core course requirements of the NCAA. Shelly Anderson, Edinboro
Freshman Frustrated by NCAA Rules on Learning Disabled, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nov. 17, 1996,
at DI2.
ioi. Ganden was given "partial qualifier" status; however, this status would not allow Ganden to
compete during his first year of college enrollment, and as the Court described, "[a]t the elite level, the
average competitive life of a swimmer is three to four years, with the peak years occurring between
ages nineteen and twenty-one." Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *12-13. Therefore, his
limited eligibility would hurt his future as a swimmer.
102. Id. at *13.
103. Id. at *29, (citing Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1270 (7th Cir. 1993)). This is
important because many of the defendants in the cases cited in this article have argued that Title III
regulates physical facilities or locations and not private membership organizations like the NCAA or
USA Hockey. In making this argument, the defendants have often looked to the Welsh case, which
dealt with membership in the Boy Scouts, finding that Title III did not regulate this type of
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to exist if: "(1) the organization is affiliated with a particular facility, and (2)
membership in (or certification by) that organization acts as a necessary
predicate to use of the facility." 104  After assessing Ganden's argument
demonstrating the NCAA's control over eligibility in intercollegiate athletics, the
Seventh Circuit initially determined that Ganden had a likelihood of success in
proving that "the NCAA constitutes a 'place of public accommodation' within
the meaning of Title IIl."105 Moreover, according to the court, the NCAA
"operates" facilities as required under Title 111,106 and its eligibility requirements
act as a "ticket" to actual use of those facilities.1 07
Still, in order for Ganden to succeed on his Title III claim he had to prove
that the NCAA's eligibility requirements "screened" him from participation
based on the fact that he was disabled and that the NCAA had refused to make
reasonable modifications of its rules as required under the ADA to accommodate
his disability. 108 By showing that the NCAA was aware of his disability and
knew that it affected his ability to meet the core requirements, Ganden
demonstrated that there was the necessary link between his disabled status and
the eligibility decision.109
The court, however, determined that a modification of the NCAA's
eligibility standards as Ganden had requested would "fundamentally alter" the
NCAA's eligibility procedures and it would be "generally unreasonable to
require the NCAA to lower this basic standard." 11 0  Ganden's motion was
denied because, as the court stated, "Title III does not require the NCAA to
simply abandon its eligibility requirements, but only to make reasonable
modifications to them. The record reveals that the NCAA did precisely that." 11
membership organization. Id.
104. Id. at *29-30 (citing Elitt v. USA Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (ED. Mo. 1996)).
lOS. Id. at *29-30.
mo6. See id. at *30-34.
1o. Id. at *31-34.
108. Id. at *34-35.
og. Id. at *40.
ito. Id. at *48.
ii. Id. at *49-50. A year after this case was decided, the Ganden's were again suing the NCAA,
this time in order to force the Association to give back the year of eligibility that Ganden had lost. See
Christie Hart, Justice Department Sides With Swimmer In NCAA Suit, Chicago Daily Herald, Nov. 5,
1997, at 5. The Justice Department sided with the Gandens at this time for several reasons. Initially,
the Department found that remedial courses of the type that disabled athletes must often take "must be
taught differently and rarely can cover the same amount of material as traditional classes." Id.
Therefore, the NCAA frequently rejects these courses, denying disabled students the same ability to
tour schools and accept scholarship offers. Id. Then if a student were able to appeal such a
determination and become a "partial qualifier" like Ganden, he would nevertheless lose a year of
eligibility. Id. The Department found that "only students with learning disabilities" were in the same
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2. Butler v. National Collegiate Athletic Association112
In a similar case, Toure Butler, a learning disabled football player from the
University of Washington was denied eligibility due to a lack of core courses and
a low GPA as determined in Ganden.113 Butler also sued the NCAA and the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington issued a
temporary restraining order allowing him to participate in football. 114
The NCAA then filed a motion to dismiss the temporary restraining
order.1 15 The court found the NCAA's argument unpersuasive. Butler pointed
to the Dennin case for the proposition that an athletic association was covered by
Title III because it regulates athletics and sponsors events. 116 In opposition the
NCAA pointed to Sandison for the proposition that the "nature" of the place of
accommodation is important and therefore, as the football facilities were
operated by a public, and not a private entity, the NCAA was not covered by
Title 111.117
The court disagreed with the NCAA and specifically with Sandison, stating
that the important inquiry is not whether the place to which the plaintiff seeks
access is public or private, but "rather, the nature of the place is determined by
who owns, leases, or operates the place."1 18 Therefore, "the determination rests
on whether the NCAA can be said to operate facilities used in connection with
the football program at the University of Washington." 11 9
Because this issue presented a mixed question of law and fact, the court
would not rule on the issue "in the context of a motion to dismiss," but instead
Butler was allowed to present evidence in court to support his claim. 120 After
denying the NCAA's motion, the court moved to a decision as to whether to
category as Ganden. Id. Therefore, in 1997, the Department began to move toward a settlement with
the NCAA. That settlement will be discussed later in this article.
112. Butler v. NCAA, Order Issuing Preliminary Injunction, No. C96-1656D, (WD. Wash. Nov. 8,
1996) [hereinafter Butler Preliminary Injunction].
113. Id. at2-3.
114. Id. at 3. See also Percy Allen, UW's Butler Returns to Field, Court, The Seattle Times, October
24, 1996, at C3.
is. Butler Preliminary Injunction, supra note 112, at 3. At the same time the Justice D partment
filed a motion for leave to participate as amicus curiae and at oral argument which the court granted.
Id. The Department joined the case in order to attempt to resolve the issues that had been brought up
in Butler, Ganden, and other cases denying disabled students eligibility.
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id. at 5-6.
11. Id. at 7.
119. Id. at 8.
120. Id. at 8-9.
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issue a preliminary injunction allowing Butler to participate in the football
program. 12 1 In this matter the court found that Butler had presented evidence
which demonstrated that the "NCAA regulates who may use.., facilities and
when, how, and under what conditions they may be used." 122 Therefore, Butler
had shown at least a probability of success, i.e. he could prove that the NCAA
was an operator of a place of public accommodation as determined under Title
III.
Finally, in balancing the harm to the parties, the court found that if Butler
were denied eligibility he would lose his scholarship and possibly be forced to
quit school, while the potential harm to the NCAA was "virtually
nonexistent."1 23  Even though Butler's likelihood of success "may not be
strong," the court issued a preliminary injunction in his favor. 12 4 Butler was the
first student to win such an injunction against the NCAA.
3. Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association125
A final important NCAA case deals with potential Temple University
football player Michael Bowers. Bowers was another learning-disabled student-
athlete who was forced to enroll in special education courses to meet
requirements in high school. As a result of the courses he took, and some
miscommunication with the NCAA, 126 Bowers was declared a nonqualifier by
the NCAA, meaning that he was ineligible to participate in athletics or receive
financial aid during his freshman year in college. 12 7
Bowers subsequently sued the NCAA and asked for a preliminary injunction
from the New Jersey District Court to force the NCAA to grant him the status
necessary to participate in athletics and receive an athletic scholarship. 12 8 The
court first asked the NCAA to consider a waiver of the eligibility rules for
Bowers, but such a waiver was denied. 129
In following largely the same reasoning as the courts have considered in the
prior cases discussed, the district court determined that Bowers was really asking
for a "virtual elimination of the 'core course' requirement, rather than merely the
'modification' or 'accommodation' required by the ADA, which the NCAA
121. ld. at 9.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 10-11.
124. Id. at 11.
125. 974 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1997).
126. Apparently some information that Bowers' high school counselors sent to clarify the courses he
took was either never received by, or never sent to, the NCAA. Id. at 462-63.
127. Id. at 463.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 463-64.
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already provides," through its waiver process. 130 As the court discussed, "the
ADA 'does not require the NCAA to simply abandon its eligibility requirements,
but only to make reasonable modifications to them.""131 The court then
followed the ruling in Ganden "finding that a complete abandonment of the 'core
course' requirement would fundamentally alter the nature of the privilege of
participation in the NCAA's intercollegiate athletic program." 132 Therefore, the
court, following Ganden, denied Bowers motion for a preliminary injunction.
The Bowers case returned to district court in June of 1998.133 The second
Bowers case dealt with the NCAA's 134 motion to dismiss Bowers' First
Amended Complaint. 135 Even though Bowers mistakenly alleged that Title II of
the ADA applied to the NCAA, in a groundbreaking decision the court initially
held that Title III applies to the NCAA. 136 Specifically the court stated that
"Bowers has adequately alleged that the NCAA owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates the place of public accommodation and that he was denied the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of that place of public accommodation." 137
After reviewing a significant amount of case law, the court stated that the
issue boils down to whether the NCAA "manages, controls, or regulates the
place or places of public accommodation" in such a way that it denied Bowers
enjoyment of the accommodation in a discriminatory fashion. 138 The court
found that Bowers had provided sufficient facts to demonstrate the NCAA's
"operation" under this test because the NCAA's enforcement power caused him
to be declared ineligible and, therefore, to be denied access to intercollegiate
athletics; the NCAA establishes the standards which caused his ineligibility, and
as a result, he could not participate in practice or games, or receive scholarship
money; and the NCAA leases and operates facilities which are places of public
130. Id. at 466.
131. Id. (quoting Ganden, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *49).
132. Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 467.
133. Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.N.J. 1998). In this second case, Bowers more explicitly
alleged that due to his status as a nonqualifier, several universities, including Temple, stopped
recruiting him and pulled their offers for athletic scholarships. See Student With LD May Proceed
With Claims Against NCAA, Colleges, Disability Compliance For Higher Education, Vol. 4, No. 1,
Aug. 1998.
134. The NCAA was joined by a few other parties not pertinent to this discussion. Only the parts of
this lengthy decision that discuss the NCAA's claims and defenses will be discussed herein.
135. Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
136. Id. at474.
137. Id at 479-80.
138. Id. at 486.
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accommodation. 139 Therefore, the NCAA's motion for summary judgment,
asking the court to determine that it was not an "operator" as defined under Title
III, was denied. 140
In regards to the NCAA's motion to dismiss the claim that it discriminates
against the learning disabled through its eligibility rules, the court found that the
NCAA's waiver process and other accommodations still might not be enough to
avoid a claim of discrimination. 14 1 In his Amended Complaint, Bowers no
longer sought a complete change in NCAA "core course" requirements. Instead,
he restricted his claim to a modification more closely tied to his particular
situation. 142 The court found it inappropriate to determine the merits of this
amended claim at the motion stage. 143 Consequently, the case was allowed to
proceed toward trial on the merits of these issues.
4. The United States vs. The NCAA 144
As a result of the above and other cases, 14 5 the NCAA made some initial
139. Id. at 486-87.
140. Id. at 489-90.
141. Id. at 477-78. The court dismissed the NCAA's claim pointing to the discussion and rulings it
presented with regard to another of the Defendants, the University of Iowa. Id. at 490. Therefore, the
arguments cited are from this earlier part of the opinion.
142. Id. at477.
143. Id.
144. United States v. NCAA, Complaint, (visited August 8, 1998) <http.//www.usdoj.gov/
crtlada/ncaacomp.htm>.
145. Three other cases have gained a lot of publicity although their precedential value is probably not
as high:
1) Tatum v. NCAA, 922 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998), dealt with Justin Tatum, a potential
basketball player at St. Louis University who has an anxiety disorder which necessitated his taking the
ACT in an untimed and nonstandard fashion. See Court Will Decide if Student Can Play Basketball at
SLU, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 18, 1998, at Cl. The NCAA determined that due to his failure to
achieve an adequate standardized ACT score, Tatum should be a nonqualifier. Tatum, 922 F. Supp. at
1118-19. In following the case law already discussed, the court found that "the NCAA is governed by
Title III of the ADA." Id. at 1121. The court went on, however, to deny Tatum's motion due to his
lack of disabled status among other factors. Id. at 1123.
2) Another athlete who has sued the NCAA is Ginger Wortley, a softball player at Lynn University.
Wortley suffers from a disorder known as "perceptual disability," which is similar to dyslexia and
which also impairs her ability to take standardized tests, As a result, her SAT score did not satisfy the
NCAA's eligibility requirements. See Joe Capozzi, Lynn Freshman Files Lawsuit For Right to Play
Softball, The Palm Beach Post, Feb. 27, 1998, at IC; Softball Player With Low SATs Knows Score
That Counts Is in Court, The San Diego Union-Tribune, Mar. 2, 1998, at D2. After making the varsity
softball team, Wortley applied for NCAA certification and was denied due to her SAT scores. See Jim
Oliphant, Tagged Out by the NCAA, Miami Daily Bus. Rev., Mar. 13, 1998, at BI. A waiver backed
by a recommendation from her school's dean was also denied. Id.
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changes in its rules in 1997. Among these changes were: (1) learning disabled
students would be able to apply for waivers on their own without leaving an
NCAA school as necessary in the past; (2) by March 1, 1997, high schools were
to begin filling out forms designating classes for disabled student-athletes
allowing the NCAA to have a list before any appeals were filed; (3) students
would be certified as learning disabled before they graduated from high school;
and (4) learning disabled student-athletes would be able to take summer courses
after their senior year that would be counted toward their NCAA eligibility. 146
Even with these changes, by October of 1997, it was reported that the Justice
Department had sent a letter to the NCAA stating that "'several aspects' of the
organization's initial eligibility requirements violate Title II of the ADA,"14 7
and finding the NCAA's application of academic standards in regard to learning-
disabled student-athletes "too rigid" while recommending remedies that could
head off legal action. 148 The Department pointed to the facts that the NCAA
excludes many courses from the "core course" requirement that are designed to
accommodate students with learning disabilities and that the waiver process is
"fundamentally flawed," leaving learning disabled student-athletes at a
disadvantage. 14 9 The Department also noted that even in cases where disabled
student-athletes are given "partial qualifier" status, the restrictions on these
student-athletes (not being allowed to practice and losing a year of eligibility) are
too great.1 50
The Department concluded that "modifications in several NCAA policies are
necessary, that reasonable modifications are available and that these
modifications would not fundamentally alter the nature of the NCAA's
program."1l 5 1
3) A final dispute concerns highly-touted basketball recruit Schea Cotton. In June of 1998, the
NCAA denied Cotton's appeal upholding its original ruling that his qualifying SAT score was invalid.
See Todd Taylor, NCAA Denies Cotton Appeal, News & Rec. (Greensboro, N.C.), June 6, 1998, at
Cl. According to the NCAA, part of the reason for the ruling was because inadequate documentation
was provided regarding his learning disability which would have demonstrated that he deserved the
non-standardized test taking accommodations that he received. A. Sherrod Blakely, The News &
Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 1I, 1998, at C1.
146. Wendy Witherspoon, NCAA Changes Aimed at Making Compliance Easier, L.A. Times, Feb.
11, 1997, at V3.
147. See Justice Department: NCAA Rules Biased Against Students With LD, Disability Compliance
For Higher Education, Vol. 3, No. 5, Dec. 1997.
148. Steve Wieberg, Justice Dept.: NCAA Violates Disabilities Act, USA Today, Oct. 30, 1997, at
IC.
149. Justice Department., supra note 147.
is0. Id.
ISl. Mark Asher, Justice: NCAA 'Too Rigid' About Learning-Disabled, Wash. Post, Oct. 31, 1997,
at D02.
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As a result of this letter and various other complaints, the Justice Department
brought the NCAA to court in the District of Columbia. In its complaint the
Department raised several allegations against the NCAA that the Department
believed constituted violations of Title III of the ADA. 152 First, the Department
alleged that the NCAA's eligibility criteria for entering student-athletes "screen
out or tend to screen out individuals with disabilities from fully and equally
enjoying the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or
accommodations that it offers," in violation of Title 111.153 Second, the
Department alleged that the NCAA failed to make up for this behavior through
reasonable modifications of its policies. 154 Third, the Department alleged that
the NCAA's policies deny students with learning disabilities an opportunity to
benefit from the services it offers. 155 And, fourth, the Department alleged that
the services provided to these disabled individuals are not equal to, or are at least
separate from, those afforded to students Without disabilities. 156 Throughout its
allegations the Department stated that all of this conduct demonstrated a pattern
and practice of discrimination against learning disabled student-athletes. 157
As a resolution to this dispute, and in order to avoid the delay and costs of a
trial, the NCAA and the Department entered into a Consent Decree in May of
1998.158 Under the Decree the NCAA basically agreed to undertake five
changes:
1) The NCAA will now certify classes designed for student-athletes with
disabilities as "core courses" if they provide them with the same type of
"knowledge and skills as other college-bound students," 159
2) Learning disabled student-athletes can now earn back their lost year of
eligibility if they can demonstrate that they have made substantial progress
toward academic success, 160
152. United States v. NCAA, Complaint (visited August 8, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/
crt/ada/ncaacomp.htm>.
153. Id. Count I, 45-51.
154. Id. Count 1I, 9 52-57.
155. Id. Count III, 9 58-62.
156. Id. Count IV, IM 63-68.
157. Id. 945-68.
158. United States v. NCAA, Consent Decree, (visited Aug. 8, 1998)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/ncaa.htm> [hereinafter Consent Decree].
159. NCAA Settlement With The Justice Department: Fact Sheet, (last revised May 27, 1998)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/ncaafact.htm> [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
160. Id. These students can gain a fourth year of eligibility if they can show that they have completed
at least 75% of their degree program by the time they reach a fifth year of college enrollment. NCAA
and Federal Government Reach Agreement on Learning Disabilities Issue, The Sports Law., July/Aug.
1998, at 3 & 15.
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3) The NCAA will include experts on disabilities when evaluating waiver
requests and will review the student-athlete's high school preparation and
performance when making a decision, 161
4) The NCAA will designate an ADA Compliance Officer who will assist
the staff and serve as a liaison to students,] 62 and
5) The NCAA will pay a total of $ 35,000.00 to four disabled student-
athletes who had been adversely affected by the old rules. 163
The NCAA made clear that it voluntarily entered into this Decree and
ensured that it did not "waive its position that it is not a place of public
accommodation and therefore Title III of the ADA does not apply to it, nor does
the NCAA admit liability under the ADA.' 164
5. Conclusion
Several judges and the Department of Justice have stated that the NCAA is
liable under the ADA. Unfortunately, no higher court decisions have been
reached finding such liability. Moreover, even though the NCAA made changes
through the Consent Decree, it steadfastly denied that it had any responsibility to
act under the ADA.
As in the interscholastic cases, the issues disputed at the collegiate level
have focused on the way in which eligibility standards and requirements may
negatively impact disabled student-athletes. The disputes have had nothing to do
with the actual participation of a disabled athlete that would then cause some sort
of accommodation in the rules or in the way in which the sport is played.
Although the interscholastic and intercollegiate cases have clearly dealt with
rules implemented by the associations or regulatory bodies to regulate sports,
these are not rules of athletic performance or performance on the field of play.
The cases in these initial two areas only deal with eligibility rules for the right to
161. Fact Sheet, supra note 159.
162. Id
163. Id. The other three students were: (1) Joel Douglas, a football player from the University of
Toledo who suffers from a series of disabilities and was found ineligible because several courses he
took did not meet the "core course" requirements, see Neil A. Lewis, N.C.A.A. Alters Learning
Disabled Policy, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1998, at C2; (2) Shawn Farester, the football player mentioned
supra note 99; and (3) a skier and baseball player who chose to remain anonymous. See Learning-
Disabled Students Now Eligible For NCAA Participation, Disability Compliance Bulletin, Vol. 12,
No. 4, June 4, 1998.
164. Consent Decree, "Agreement," (visited Aug. 30, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/
crt/ada/ncaa.htm>. Because of this lack of an admission of liability, many individuals are still not
satisfied with the changes the NCAA has made. For example, see Critics Claim NCAA Settlement
Only a 'Small Amount of Progress,' Disability Compliance For Higher Education, Vol. 3, No. 12, July
1998.
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participate in the first instance.
In the end, it is unclear whether the NCAA can be held liable under the
ADA. Moreover, even if it might be held liable, it is still uncertain how a higher
court would deal with a case where an eligible athlete seeks some
accommodation of the actual rules or conditions of play.
C. Other Non-Professional Sports165
In order to present a description of the entire picture surrounding the ADA's
application to sports, it is necessary to also discuss cases dealing with other non-
professional sporting organizations.
1. USA Hockey
USA Hockey is the organization which sponsors amateur hockey
organizations throughout the United States with recognition by the United States
Olympic Committee. 166  One of USA Hockey's functions is to provide
insurance coverage for individual hockey clubs and to set age guidelines for
these clubs. 167
Mark Elitt is a disabled athlete stricken with Attention Deficit Disorder
("ADD") and severe language impairments. 16 8 As a result of his disabilities,
Mark Elitt can only participate in hockey with a family member on the ice with
him, otherwise he loses his focus and concentration. 169 Elitt has participated at
the lower level age groups at the Creve Coeur Hockey Club, presenting no safety
hazards to himself or other participants.1 70 Elitt's parents petitioned the Club to
allow Mark to continue to participate at his current level instead of moving up to
the next level of competition.171 The request was denied mainly due to
insurance considerations that Mark would be a safety risk if he participated at the
younger age level. 172
The Elitts sued USA Hockey and the Creve Coeur Hockey Club asking for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to compel the Club to
165. This section will focus on cases where a party has sued a sporting organization that is not at the
interscholastic or intercollegiate level and that is not within one of the major professional leagues
either.
166. Elitt, 922 F. Supp. at 218.
167. Id. at218, 220.
168. Id. at 218.
169. Id. at 218-20.
170. Id. at 220.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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allow Mark to participate in hockey as a reasonable accommodation under Title
III of the ADA. 173 As a threshold consideration the district court found that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address the Elitts claim under Title III
because "plaintiffs must first show denial of access to a place of public
accommodation. Plaintiffs make no such showing because they allege denial of
participation in the youth hockey league instead of access to a place of public
accommodation, i.e. the ice rink."' 174
Additionally, the Elitts could not show that USA Hockey or the Hockey
Club owned, operated, or leased a place of public accommodation.175 The court
found that since Title III focused on "places" and did not list membership
organizations in its list of twelve categories 176 of "places of public
accommodation,"' 177 and since such organizations have generally been excluded
from the definition of public accommodation under Title 11,178 USA Hockey
should also be excluded.
Moreover, the court found that "the requested modifications would not be
reasonable," as allowing Elitt's family members onto the ice could cause serious
disruptions of the games played, and because the age level rules "are important
because they group players who are roughly the same skill and size."' 179
2. Little League & Pony League Baseball
Similar cases have been brought at the amateur baseball level although the
results of these cases have been strikingly different. In Anderson v. Little League
Baseball, Inc., a wheelchair bound first base coach sought a temporary
restraining order to bar Little League Baseball from enforcing a rule specifically
designed to keep him from coaching in the coaches box.' 80
As one of the earliest cases dealing with the ADA in the sports context, the
district court discussed the history behind the Act noting that "we must bring
Americans with disabilities into the mainstream of society 'in other words, full
participation in and access to all aspects of society.' 18 1  Unlike the cases
173. Id. at 218.
174. Id. at 223.
175. Id. In fact the court stated that "[pilaintiffs did not introduce any evidence during the evidentiary
hearings to make the necessary connection between defendants ... and the ice rink." Id. That
conclusion is rather odd as this sort of "operation" of a facility is exactly the type of operation
discussed in the NCAA cases.
176. As set out in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994).
177. Elit, 922 F. Supp. at 223.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 224-25.
i 0. Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 343-44 (D. Ariz. 1992).
181. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 317),
HeinOnline  -- 1 Va. J. Sports & L. 70 1999
SPRING 1999 SPOILING A GOOD WALK VOL. 1: 1
discussed so far, Little League Baseball did not challenge Anderson's allegation
that it was covered by Title 111.182
However, this case is helpful in that the court notes that an entity is not
required under Title III to permit a person to participate if they are a "direct
threat to the health or safety of others." 183  Unfortunately for Little League
Baseball, it never conducted an individual assessment of: "(1) the nature,
duration, and severity of the risk; (2) the probability that the potential injury will
actually occur; and (3) whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices,
or procedures will mitigate the risk." 184  Therefore, the court decided that
Anderson and the children he works with would suffer irreparable harm "if
defendants are permitted to arguably discriminate against plaintiff based upon
his disability." 185 As a result the restraining order was granted and Little
League Baseball was prevented from implementing its rule.
Although this case is one of the few sports related cases allowing such an
injunction, it must be noted that the court took specific notice of the fact that the
rule was implemented "without public discourse" and almost specifically
because of the plaintiff, and this weighed in favor of the plaintiff's showing the
harm. With a properly implemented rule supported by real safety concerns,
however, the result may not have been the same.
In another baseball related case, Geoffrey Shultz, a baseball player with
cerebral palsy, was barred from participation in a certain age division by Hemet
Youth Pony League, Inc., of California, a member of PONY Baseball, Inc. 186
As in the other cases mentioned, Shultz sued the Youth Pony League under Title
III of the ADA. 187
The court found that the Baseball League was covered by Title III because
(1) Shultz was disabled, (2) the League was an owner or operator of a place of
public accommodation "irrespective of their link to any physical facilities,"' 188
and (3) the League discriminated against Shultz on the basis of his disability and
"assumed [without substantiating] concerns of a possible risk of harm to Plaintiff
and other players, and insurance ramifications." 189 And, as the League never
considered "any modification to any of Pony's Rules, policies or practices that
might accommodate Plaintiff's disability," their conduct was "discriminatory
t82. Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 344.
183. Id. at 345.
184. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c)(1998)).
185. Id.
186. Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1222 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
187. Shultz, 943 F. Supp. at 1224.
ls. Id. at 1225.
is9. Id.
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inaction against Plaintiff on the basis of [his] disability." 190 Therefore, Shultz's
motion was granted.
3. Bicycle Racing
A final case dealt with a cyclist whose disability caused him to ride a
specially designed tricycle. 19 1 The facts of the case are not as important to this
analysis, yet some of the courts' language is particularly interesting. In
analyzing whether the race organizer was covered under Title III of the ADA,
the court stated that "[tjhey are not analogous to any of the public
accommodations listed in the statute. The defendants are closer in identity to a
youth hockey or professional football league, which have not been found to be
public accommodations, in that they are umbrella groups that organized an
event."' 192 The court also made specific reference to Elitt as it stated that "Mr.
Brown does not allege that he was denied access to a physical place. He alleges
that he was denied a chance to participate in the ParaAmerica. That allegation
does not meet the definition of public accommodation." 1 93 Therefore, the
organizers were not liable under the ADA.
While the Brown case seems to have reached a logical result as the race took
place over public streets which the race organizer could not have controlled as an
owner, operator, or lessor, the language of the case does not add clarity to the
overall impact of the ADA in sports. In fact, although the court recognizes cases
where sporting organizations have not been found amenable to suit under the
ADA, it neglects to recognize the baseball cases and some of the NCAA and
interscholastic athletics cases wherein similar organizations were found liable
under the ADA.
4. Conclusion
At this point it may seem that the analysis of the ADA's impact on the rules
of sport has become increasingly confusing. However, the four cases just
described seem to provide at least a modicum of guidance. From these cases it
seems that the issue as to whether Title III applies to a specific sport governing
body turns on the question of operation and control of the place of public
accommodation. Therefore, the organizations with a higher degree of control
(the baseball leagues) were amenable to suit under Title III, while the
organization not as closely tied to the public accommodation (the race organizer)
190. Id. at 1225-26.
191. Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 959 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. I11. 1997).
192. Id. at 499 (presumably referring to the Elit case and the professional sports cases which will be
discussed).
193. Id. (citing Elitt, 922 F. Supp. at 223).
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was not.
The anomalous case was Elitt. The control and rule making authority
exercised by USA Hockey and specifically by the Hockey Club that Elitt wanted
to be a part of seems clearly as strong as, if not stronger than, that of the amateur
baseball leagues. What must be assumed then is that the court really focused on
the age limitation's health and safety rationale (as in the high school cases) and
found this to be essential and fundamental. Therefore, any modification of these
age rules would be unreasonable.
D. Professional Leagues
There have been only two cases which have dealt with the ADA's
application to the professional sports leagues. Admittedly, these cases were
brought by spectators or fans and not by participants in the sports themselves as
in all the other cases described below; however, each courts' analysis of the
ADA's application to these professional sports leagues is important.
1. Stoutenborough v. National Football League
In 1994, the National Football League's ("NFL") blackout policy (which
prohibits the local broadcast of a home game when there is not a sell-out up to
three days before the game) was attacked by several hearing impaired fans. The
fans sued the NFL claiming that the rule discriminated against them in
contravention of the ADA because they were prohibited from listening to the
radio due to their impairment. 194 In other words, when Browns games were
blacked out, these disabled fans could not receive coverage of the games.
After quickly dismissing the plaintiff's claims under Title I and II of the
ADA, the district court then considered Title 111.195 Although the court admitted
that a football stadium was a place of public accommodation, it determined that
the service the plaintiffs claimed they were being denied access to (the game
being televised) was not a service of the public accommodation itself and that,
consequently, Title III did not apply. 196 As the court stated, "[i]n order for the
statute to apply, plaintiffs would have to argue that the Rule is denying them full
and equal employment of services of the stadium."197
On appeal the Sixth Circuit again held that Title III did not apply to the
NFL. 19 8 As the court stated, "the hearing and the hearing-impaired populations
194. Stoutenborough v. NFL, 1994 WL 506150, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 18, 1994).
195. Id. at *2.
196. Id. at *3.
197. Id. (emphasis added).
19a. Stoutenborough v. NFL, 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1028 (1995).
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attain equal footing as radio broadcasts become available to both,"1 99 and "the
prohibitions of Title III are restricted to 'places' of public accommodation,
disqualifying the National Football League... [and] its member clubs .... ."200
2. Cortez v. National Basketball Association20 1
In a substantially similar case, the National Basketball Association ("NBA")
was sued by several hearing-impaired individuals who claimed that the NBA had
to accommodate them under the ADA by providing interpretive and captioning
services for hearing impaired individuals at NBA games. 202 The plaintiffs relied
on the NBA's Facility Standards as guidelines that showed the NBA exercised a
significant amount of operational control over the Alamodome, a public
accommodation. 2 03 However, the court found that the guidelines did not relate
to the plaintiff's accommodation requests and that "there is no evidence the NBA
owns, leases (or leases to) or operates a place of public accommodation. '204
Therefore, the ADA did not apply in this suit.
3. Conclusion
These two cases dealing with professional sports leagues do not change the
analysis as presented so far. The courts in these cases found that Title III did not
apply because of a lack of control or operation by the leagues, similar to the
cases discussed above.
Moreover, these suits were brought by individuals that were not suing to
participate in the sport itself and, thus, are probably not similar enough to the
cases already presented to stand for any controlling proposition that the ADA in
all cases would not apply to these leagues. If a player or potential player were to
sue to have a league reasonably modify its rules to allow him to participate in the
sport, it is unclear whether Title III would apply to these eligibility-type rules
that barred the individual from participation. This issue has not been specifically
addressed with respect to the professional leagues.
E. Sports Facility Cases
A final area where many lawsuits have been brought within the sports
context is with regard to access to sports facilities themselves. Many cases have
i99. Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 582.
200. Id. at 583.
201. 960 F. Supp. 113 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
202. Id. at 114.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 116.
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been brought against the architects, designers, and owners of these facilities in
order to force them to comply with the ADA's special regulations regarding
facility access.2 05
These cases will not be discussed in depth2 06 because the issues resolved
therein are only peripherally related to the participation of disabled athletes in
particular sports. Facility-access cases have dealt with issues such as sightlines
in the facility, mainly for wheelchair users, and whether Section 4.33.3 of the
Justice Department's Standards for Accessible Design as promulgated under
Title III has been met.20 7 And as Title III specifically applies to sports stadiums
and arenas as places of public accommodation, the Title III question was not
difficult. The focus in these cases instead is on "reasonable" accommodations or
modifications in these structures to accommodate the disabled as mandated by
the Department's Standards.
III. CASEY MARTIN AND THE RULES OF GOLF
Perhaps no case involving the ADA's affect on the sports world has grabbed
the public's attention as much as the Casey Martin case. Before analyzing the
case itself, some background information is necessary.
A. The PGA and Disabled Golfers
The Professional Golfers' Association ("PGA") is the association which
205. See Stadium related cases: Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'r,
P.C., 945 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'r,
P.C, 950 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1996); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects &
Eng'r, P.C, 950 F. Supp. 393 (D.D.C. 1996); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d
579 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Washington Sports & Entertainment Inc. v. United Coastal Ins. Co., 7 F. Supp.
2d I (D.D.C. 1998) (dealing with the D.C. Arena operators claim against its insurance company as a
result of the previous cases); United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn. 1997)
& accompanying CONSENT ORDER; Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F.
Supp. 698 (D. Ore. 1997); Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., I F. Supp. 2d 1124
(D. Ore. 1998); Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., I F. Supp. 2d 1159 (D. Ore.
1998). See also cases relating to other sports and entertainment facilities: Johanson v. Huizenga
Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment
Ctre., 968 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1997).
206. For in depth discussion of these cases and the issues surrounding sports facility access, see Mark
A. Conrad, Wheeling Through Rough Terrain - The Legal Roadblocks of Disabled Access in Sports
Arenas, 8 Marq. Sports L.J. 263 (1998); Mark A. Conrad, Disabled-Seat Pact May Unify Standard For
New Stadiums, Law Journal Extra! Sports & Entertainment Law (from the New York Law Journal,
May 8, 1998), (visited June 1, 1998) <http://www.ljx.com/practice/sports/0508seats.html>.
207. Conrad, Disabled-Seat Pact, supra note 206.
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regulates and administers events for professional golfers in the United States. 20 8
The purpose of the PGA is to "regulate, promote, and improve the business of
professional tournament golf."209 A key to the success of the PGA has been
"the ability of its players to set rules that ensure both healthy competition and the
growth of the sport through the players' organization .... 210 The PGA has
seldom been swayed to bend its rules in matters dealing with personal safety and
comfort.2 11 In fact, "[t]he underlying philosophy of all this is to create equity
among players of contrasting abilities, thus, in theory at least, increasing the
pleasure for everyone."'2 12
The PGA sponsors three tours for professional golfers: the PGA Tour, the
Senior PGA Tour, and the Nike Tour.2 13 The Nike Tour acts as a "minor
league" or qualifying tour to reach the PGA Tour.2 14
There are several methods by which a player can gain the privilege of
playing on the PGA Tour. The main one is through a three-stage qualifying
school tournament.2 15 The first stage consists of 72 holes, on which the lowest
scoring individuals advance to the second stage of 72 holes.2 16 The top
qualifiers then advance to the third and final stage which consists of 108
holes. 2 17 The lowest thirty-five finishers plus ties win playing privileges on the
PGA Tour, while players who do not win this privilege in the qualifying school
may still make the PGA Tour by winning three Nike Tour events in a single year
or by finishing in the top fifteen places on the Nike Tour's money list. 2 18 In the
first two stages of qualifying, players can use a cart, although such use is
prohibited on the PGA and Nike Tour.2 19
The PGA has had some history dealing with disabled golfers in the past. In
1950, Ben Hogan won the U.S. Open only sixteen months after suffering a near-
208. Al Barkow, Golf's Golden Grind: The History of the Tour 57 (1974).
209. Charles R. Daniel 11, The PGA Tour: Successful Self-Regulation or Unreasonably Restraining
Trade?, 4 Sports Law. J. 41,42 (1997).
210. Id. at41.
211. George Eberl, Golf is a Good Walk Spoiled 112 (1992).
212. Id. at39.
213. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1321 (D. Ore. 1998).
214. Tony Snow, Editorial: PGA Needs to Do Right Thing For Casey Martin, Fla. Today, Jan. 19,
1998, at 9A.
215. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1321-22.
219. Id. at 1322. The Senior PGA Tour (golfers 50 years or older) allows the use of carts. Id. at
1322 n. 1. In fact, the actual rules of golf as adopted by the United States Golf Association and the
Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews, Scotland (and followed by the PGA), include a golf cart
as "Equipment." USGA, The Rules of Golf 1998-1999, at 10.
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fatal car accident.220 In 1954, Ed Furgol won the U.S. Open despite a withered
left arm suffered in a childhood accident. 22 1 And in 1964, Ken Venturi won the
U.S. Open nearly collapsing from the heat by the end of the round.2 2 2
By 1987, the cart debate had first become an issue for disabled players when
Charlie Owens, who had been injured in a parachuting accident, petitioned the
PGA for the use of a cart during a tournament. 2 2 3 Similarly, in the same year
Lee Elder asked for permission to use a cart after suffering a mild heart
attack. 2 2 4 Both golfers were denied the use of a cart. 2 2 5
Of course these requests were made before the passage of the ADA. "With
the passage of [the ADA], it was anticipated that more disabled individuals
would enter or re-enter the game. A review of the major golf organizations in
1992 clearly indicated that they were not prepared to accept or successfully deal
with this population. 226
B. Casey Martin
Casey Martin was born with Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, a rare
disorder which causes a progressively worsening muscle and bone condition in
his right leg that results in pain when he walks. 227 Martin started playing golf at
age six, won junior championships in Oregon, and then went to Stanford
University, where he was the captain of the 1994 team that won the NCAA
220. Nick Charles & Don Sider, Fairway or No Way?, People, Feb. 9, 1998, at 48.
221. Bob Weisgerber, Disabilities and Golf, (visited June 9, 1998)
<http://www.goftlodaymagazine.com/frames/bestcolumns/guestcolumns/disabilities.html>.
222. Charles & Sider, supra note 220. Comparison to Hogan and Venturi is at least questionable as
both of these golfers were not disabled. Contrary to Martin, they had the opportunity to recover. John
Garrity, Out On a Limb, Sports Illustrated, Feb. 9, 1998, at GIO.
223. Cameron Morfit, Winning A La Cart While Preparing to Fight the Tour For the Right to Ride,
Sports Illustrated, Jan. 19, 1998, at G6.
224. Id
225. Id. The USGA does have rules which are specifically geared to "allow the disabled golfer to
play equitably with an able-bodied individual or a golfer with another type of disability." The United
States Golf Association and the Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews, Scotland, A
Modification of the Rules of Golf for Golfers With Disabilities (visited June 30, 1998)
<www.usga.com/rules/golfers with disabilities.html>. These rules do apply at the highest level of
competition but do not contain a modification of the type sought by Casey Martin. Saul Keeton,
Playing by the Rules (Disabled Golfers), Vol. 32, No. 6 Parks & Recreation, 1997 WL 9505016, June
1,1997.
226. The Association of Disabled American Golfers (visited Oct. 1, 1998)
<http://www.toski.com/golf/index.html>.
227. Disabled Golfer Able to Use Cart in Qualifier, The Colombian, Nov. 30, 1997.
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championship. 228 After leaving Stanford, Martin walked for two years on the
Hooters tour, though he also played on the Tommy Armour tour because it
allowed carts. 229 After this two-year period, Martin entered the PGA Tour
qualifying school tournament in the hopes of making the PGA or Nike Tour. He
made it through the first two stages of the tournament using a cart as allowed
under the rules but was barred from using a cart in the third stage. 230
Martin sued the PGA Tour claiming that the "no cart" rule during this third
stage failed to make tournaments accessible to the disabled in violation of the
ADA. 23 1 The Oregon District Court granted Martin a preliminary injunction
allowing Martin to use a cart in the third stage.232 As a result, the PGA Tour
lifted the "no-cart" rule for the third stage and up to twenty entrants used carts
for this stage, including the first place finisher Scott Verplank.233 As part of the
stipulation with the PGA, Martin was also allowed to use a cart in two
tournaments on the Nike Tour.234 He won the first event, the Lakeland
Classic. 235  After the initial injunction was granted, the PGA moved for
summary judgment contending that the ADA does not apply to the PGA Tour or
its events.23 6
22a. Blaine Newnham, PGA Officials Should Do Right Thing, The Seattle Times, Dec. 1I, 1997.
229. Morfit, supra note 223.
230. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
231. Id,
232. Id.
233. Steve Harrison, Disabled Pro Golfer Fights No-Cart Rule, Wash. Post, Dec. 10, 1997, at Al.
The PGA Tour argued that walking was an integral part of the game of golf and that Martin's suit
"challenged the PGA Tour's right to determine the conditions of our competitions, including requiring
all players to walk." Id. at A14. As Martin stated, "I don't take any great joy in wanting a cart .... I'd
be thrilled to be able to walk the course like everyone else. I just can't." Harry Blauvelt, Pro Golfer
Rides Out Storm, USA Today, Jan. 7, 1998, at IC. As one attorney stated:
The walking in golf... is what I would call an aesthetic incidental. It is not a primary part of the
game. Nobody goes to a golf match to say, 'Gee, I'm here because I like to see the way Palmer or
Tiger Woods walks the course.' They go there to see them tee off, finesse the shots from the
rough or the sand traps, or putt. They don't go there to see them storming up hills and dales.
[On likening the case to a football quarterback] That's not this case. A primary part of your
ability to be on the field is your ability to run to avoid tackles, to run out of the pocket. That is
part of the game itself... Or a better analogy is a baseball player who can play the game perfectly
but has an endurance walking problem and needs a golf cart to take him from the dugout to the
pitching mound or to home plate .... That would destroy the sport. It interferes with the basic
essence of the offense and the defense of the game itself.
Joe ConCannon, Time to Put the Can Before the Judge, The Boston Globe, Feb. 1, 1998, at D13.
234. Morfit, supra note 223.
235. Id.
236. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
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1. The Motion
The magistrate judge dealt with several claims under the ADA. Initially, the
PGA argued that it was exempt from Title III of the ADA as a private non-profit
establishment or club.237 However, in discussing this exemption, the court did
not agree with the PGA. The court first noted that "[g]enerating revenue for
members scarcely seems to qualify as the type of protectable interest Congress
had in mind when it excluded private clubs .... -238 Furthermore, in assessing
the factors used by courts that have evaluated such a claim of exempt status, the
court also sided against the PGA. 239
Additionally, the PGA claimed that it was not a private entity operating a
"place of public accommodation" as defined under the ADA. The court first
noted that a golf course is specifically included as such an accommodation in the
ADA.240
The PGA then argued that "since the public gallery is not allowed inside the
playing area, the fairways and greens of its golf courses are not places of public
accommodation. '24 1 In answer to this, the court stated that "the statute and
regulations do not support the concept that places of public accommodation have
zones of ADA application." 242
The PGA tried to make an analogy to a baseball stadium arguing that the
bleacher area where the public is seated would be subject to the ADA, but the
dugout where no public person can come is not.2 43 The court first pointed to the
Independent Living Resources case noting that the court therein found that "the
executive suites in the arena, even though not open to the general public, are
subject to the ADA."'2 44 The court then noted that the PGA's argument did not
237. Id. at 1323. The exemption referred to is found at 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1994).
238. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324.
239. Id. at 1324-1325. The court looked at seven factors in making this determination, several of
which are of particular interest. (1) "Genuine Selectivity" - The court found that the PGA was made
up of the most skilled golfers and not made up specifically of select individuals who share the same
philosophy based on some criteria dealing with free association. Id. (2) "Membership Control" -
Unlike most private clubs, the PGA Tour is made up of members who play their way in; they are not
voted in. Id. at 1325. (3) "Use of Facilities by Nonmembers" - The Tour actually relies very heavily
on non-members to run and regulate events. Id. (4) "[A]dvertisfing] for Members" - Although the
PGA may not literally solicit members, it is covered so extensively by the media that it has little need
to do so. Id. (5) "Nonprofit" - Although the PGA is a nonprofit organization, its main purpose is to
enhance profits for its members. Id. All of these factors weighed against the PGA being treated as a
private club.
240. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994).
241. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1327.
244. Id. at 1327 (citing Independent Living Resources, 982 F. Supp. at 758-59).
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recognize that "people other than its own Tour members are indeed allowed
within the boundary lines of play,"24 5 like caddies, and so its argument could not
win. As the court asked, "[i]f this were the law, how could such be reconciled
with the inclusion of private schools, whose corridors, classrooms, and restrooms
are clearly not accessible to the public, on the list of places of public
accommodation? 24 6 Therefore, the PGA's motion was denied.
247
2. The Case
The case finally went to court in February of 1998. Before moving to the
substantive claims of the case in its opinion, the court discussed the many sports
related cases that have been discussed briefly below. 248 Relying on these cases,
the PGA had argued that the court should focus on whether the rule (here the
"no-cart" rule) is "'substantive'-i.e., a rule which defines who is eligible to
compete or a rule which governs how the game is played." 24 9  Therefore,
according to the PGA, if a rule is "substantive," it "cannot be modified without
working a fundamental alteration of the competition, and the ADA consequently
does not require any modification to such a rule to accommodate the
disabled." 2 50
The court responded by noting that the cases mentioned actually looked to
the purpose for the rule to determine the reasonableness of the modification. 25 1
For instance, in Sandison and McPherson the age requirements were "closely
fitted with the purpose of high school athletics-to allow students of the same
age group to compete against each other," and eliminating these rules would
have "clearly change[d] the fundamental nature of such competition."'2 52 Also,
in Bowers, the "core course" requirements were academic requirements for
participation, and waiving these requirements would "obviously alter the
fundamental nature of the program," especially when the NCAA allowed
individual assessments and waivers. 253 In tying together its discussion (and the
cases discussed below), the court stated:
Although the PGA Tour is a professional sports organization and
245. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1327,
246. Id.
247. Id. The issue as to whether the PGA was an employer as regulated under the ADA was deferred
until trial. Id.
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professional sports enjoys... a much higher profile and display of skills
than collegiate or other lower levels of competitive sports, the analysis of
the issues does not change from one level to the next .... [T]he ADA
does not distinguish between sports organizations and other entities when
it comes to applying the ADA to a specific situation... the disabled have
just as much interest in being free from discrimination in the athletic
world as they do in other aspects of everyday life.254
In reaching the substantive claims, the magistrate court began by dismissing
Martin's Title I claim, stating "I reject ... plaintiff's claims that he is a PGA
Tour employee and that the Nike Tour is a 'course or examination' under the
Act."'25 5 As Martin was not an employee, Title I's prohibition against
discrimination aimed at disabled employees did not apply.
The court then noted that Martin had met his burden in showing that he was
disabled, something the PGA did not contradict. 256 The court next moved to a
discussion of whether the requested use of a cart was a reasonable modification
as required under the ADA. In assessing this reasonableness, the court noted that
the Rules of Golf do not require walking, and the PGA Tour itself allows cart use
in both the Senior Tour and the Qualifying Tournament. 257 Furthermore, the
court noted that the NCAA and the Pacific 10 Conference both permit the use of
carts. 258 All of this was compelling evidence of the reasonableness of the
modification.
In answer to this, the PGA argued initially that the analysis should not focus
on an individualized assessment of Casey Martin and the cart as a modification
for him; instead it should focus on a change in the rule as fundamentally altering
the sport. 259 The court pointed out that in light of decisions in the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits,2 60 the PGA Tour's argument was wrong, and the actual issue in
the case was "whether allowing plaintiff, given his individualized circumstances,
the requested modification would fundamentally alter PGA and Nike Tour golf
competitions." 26 1
In analyzing whether the use of a cart would fundamentally alter the game of
golf, the court began by analyzing the Rules themselves. As the court stated,
234. Id.
255. Id. at 1247.
256. Id. at 1248.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1249.
260. Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir. 1997); Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480
(9th Cir. 1996).
261. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.
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"[n]othing in the rules of golf requires or defines walking as part of the
game." 262 Moreover, before Martin had requested the use of a cart, he had tried
many other ways including artificial aids in order to allow him to walk a golf
course, but every attempt proved futile.263 In the end "Casey Martin cannot
walk the course, and only a cart will permit him to compete on the Nike
Tour." 264
Commentators and other golfers had also argued that allowing Martin to use
a cart would be unfair due to the fatigue factor involved in walking during a
round of golf.265 However, as the court explained, "the fatigue factor injected
into the game of golf by walking the course cannot be deemed significant under
normal circumstances. '266 Most of the evidence showed that the actual fatigue
in golf was from dehydration and heat exhaustion and not from walking itself.2 67
Furthermore, most other able-bodied golfers preferred walking for psychological
reasons even when given the choice of using a cart.2 68 If a cart gave Martin
such an advantage, why is it the case that all golfers did not use a cart when it
was made available to them?
And, in fact, Martin still must walk from his cart to his shots and back again.
The fatigue and pain he feels due to his disability is "undeniably greater than the
fatigue injected into tournament play on the able-bodied by the requirement that
they walk from shot to shot... [t]o perceive that the cart puts him ... at a
competitive advantage is a gross distortion of reality."'2 69
Therefore, the PGA Tour's arguments lost because "it does not
fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA Tour's game to accommodate
[Martin] with a cart... [and t]he requested accommodation of a cart is
eminently reasonable in light of Casey Martin's disability."'270
3. The Aftermath
The PGA immediately began an appeal of this decision. 27 1 By April 1998,
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1249-50.
264. Id. at 1250.
265. Several golfers such as Arnold Palmer and Jack Nicklaus had argued that allowing him to use a
cart would ruin the level playing field for tournaments. Judge Rules in Favor of Casey Martin, Sports
Network, Feb. 12, 1998.
266. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250.
267. Id. at 1250-51.
268. Id. at 1251-52.
269. ld at 1251-52.
270. Id. at 1252.
271. Noreen Seebacher, Employers' Focus Turns to Disabilities: With Golfer's Case Making
Headlines, Many Again Question Parameters of the ADA, Det. News, Feb. 25, 1998, at B4.
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reports surfaced that the PGA and Martin were unable to reach a settlement of
the case as mandated by the Ninth Circuit.2 72
In the midst of these negotiations, Martin and the PGA, however, did reach
what have come to be known as the "Approved Casey Martin Cart Rules."'2 73
Under this eleven-point agreement, Martin agreed that the cart he used would not
be operated at a speed faster than as if he and his caddie were walking, that no
advertising would be allowed on the cart, and that the cart would be of standard
design powered by an electric motor.2 74
By May of 1998, the USGA decided that the cart Martin would be required
to ride would be a one-seat single-rider model which would cause less damage to
turf and rough on the golf course.2 75 Soon after Martin was given the single-
seater cart, he encountered problems when the cart broke down during a
tournament in San Francisco,2 76 and the brakes froze during practice rounds at
the U.S. Open. 2 77 As a result of these continued problems, the USGA decided to
allow Martin to use a normal two seat golf cart although the USGA cited safety
reasons as their main concern. 278
4. The Appeal
As the appeal process began to take shape, the Justice Department filed a
friend-of-the-court brief supporting Martin. 279 The Department's brief noted
that the official rule book of golf states that "[t]he Game of Golf consists in
playing a ball from the teeing ground into the hole by a stroke or successive
strokes in accordance with the rules," and, therefore, as the district court found,
"[allowing Martin to use a cart] does not fundamentally alter the competition, so
it should be allowed to ensure access for the disabled."'2 80
Another Martin supporter is the Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome ("KTS")
272. No Agreement, USA Today, April 29, 1998, at Cl.
273. Ron Sirak, Golf Notes: On Casey's Cart, Apr. 28, 1998 <http://golf.com /news/view.cgi>.
274. Harry Blauvelt, Martin, PGA Tour Agree on Cart Rules, USA Today, Apr. 23, 1998, at 13C;
Martin-PGA Cart Agreement, Apr. 23, 1998, at 17C.
275. Harry Blauvelt, USGA Decrees New Wheels For Martin, USA Today, May 7, 1998, at 10C.
276. Reid Chemer, Martin Gets into U.S. Open Bad Cart Doesn't Stop Playoff Win, USA Today,
June 9, 1998, at C1.
277. Harry Blauvelt, Cart Troubles Stall Martin's 1st Practice Round, USA Today, June 16, 1998, at
3C.
278. Jerry Potter & Harry Blauvelt, USGA Decides to Allow Martin to Use Two-Rider Cart, USA
Today, June 17, 1998, at9C.
279. Michael Grunwald, U.S. Launches Drive For Disabled Golfer, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1998, at
A02; Justice Dept. Joins Casey's Cart Fight, N.Y. Post, Aug. 19, 1998, at 054.
28o. Grunwald, supra note 279.
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Support Group, which filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of Martin. 2 8 1 As
the KTS Brief argued, "[tihe ADA was not intended solely to increase access for
persons with disabilities to attend places of public accommodation as spectators;
it also speaks to participation in public accommodations by persons with
disabilities. '282 This is important because the PGA has consistently argued that
it does accommodate the disabled in the public areas of a course (those who
attend), but it argues that the ADA should not apply on the playing area (where
one could participate).283 The KTS Brief ends by stating that "Casey Martin's
use of a golf cart in PGA events simply does not cause any fundamental
alteration of the game."'2 84
As the appeal has not yet been heard, the Ninth Circuit's opinion on this
issue still remains to be seen.
C. Ford Olinger
A few months after the initial Martin decision, another disabled golfer sued
to be able to use a golf cart in a competition. On May 14, 1998, Ford Olinger, a
golfer with bilateral avascular necrosis, which limits his ability to walk, filed a
complaint against the USGA due to its failure to allow him to use a cart during
qualifying stages of the USGA Open Championship in Indiana. 285
Olinger is a professional golfer who registered for the Local Qualifying
rounds for the U.S. Open in April of 1998. At the same time, he also sent a
request to the USGA to be allowed to use a cart in the qualifying stages as an
281. The Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome Support Group is a private, non-profit association with its
mission to provide support to Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome patients and their families. Brief of The
Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome Support Group, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee, Aug. 17,
1998 (hereinafter KTS Brief].
282. Id. at3.
283. The KTS Brief also pointed out that other leagues have been more accommodating to the
disabled. MLB allowed Jim Abbot (who was bom without a right hand) to spin the ball in his hand
before pitching, which is contrary to the rules of baseball. Id. at 11. Both baseball and the NFL have
made accommodations for deaf players. Id. at 12. And, even the NFL allowed Tom Dempsey, who
had a disabled foot, to wear special shoes as he kicked his record longest field goal. Id.
The KTS Brief also points to the NCAA cases already discussed for the proposition that the
NCAA has been found to be an operator of a place of public accommodation under Title III of the
ADA. Id. at 12 (citing Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1121; Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17368, at *25-
34; Bowers, 1998 WL 300552, at *27-28).
284. Id. at 20.
2s5. Ford Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, Complaint, Case No. 3:98CV252RM (N.D Ind., May
14, 1998); Harry Blauvelt, Indiana Pro Seeks OK To Use Cart, USA Today, May 14, 1998, at I IC;
Disabled Golfer Requests Injunction, AP Online, May 14,1998.
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accommodation for his disability.2 86 After his request was denied, Olinger filed
a motion against the USGA in order to force the USGA to allow him to use a cart
during qualifying.
Although the arguments on both sides of this case are very similar to that in
the Casey Martin case, it is interesting to analyze them as they demonstrate how
sports organizations, even after the cases discussed herein, are still loathe to
admit that the ADA does apply in the sports context.
Olinger argued that the USGA, as was the PGA Tour in Martin, is subject to
regulation under Title III of the ADA. Due to his disability, Olinger argued that
he would be at:
an especially pronounced competitive disadvantage in that [he] will not
be able to judge distances, assess the size or extent of hazards, determine
whether current ground conditions are favorable or not or evaluate the
contour of the course, all of which are part of establishing the rhythm of
the game required for competitive level of play, as well as the able-
bodied participants who get to walk the course.2z7
As Olinger noted, his harm from not being allowed to use a cart would
equate to a denial of his participation in the event -- a serious and irreparable
harm. 28 8
In opposition to Olinger's arguments, the USGA argued in much the same
way as the PGA Tour had, while recognizing that the PGA had lost in the Martin
case. 289 The USGA noted correctly that it was never a party to the Martin case
and so its ruling did not apply to the USGA; 290 however, the USGA may have
underestimated the breadth of the arguments in the Martin case itself.
Although much of the USGA's argument is repetitious in light of the Martin
case, a few of the ways in which it tried to avoid liability under the ADA are
interesting. Initially, the USGA argued that the "places of public
accommodation" language in the ADA actually refers to "places which are open
to the public at large, with no restrictions on access other than payment of a
specified fee for admission or services." 29 1 This argument seems to mirror the
286. Ford Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Verified Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Case No. 3:98CV252RM, 2 (N.D. Ind., May 14, 1998).
287. Id. at2.
288. Id. at 5-7.
289. Ford Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, Defendant's Opposition to Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Case No. 3:98CV252RM (N.D. Ind., May 15, 1998).
290. Ford Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, United States Golf Association's Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Case No. 3:98CV252RM, 3
(N.D. Ind., May 15, 1998) [hereinafter USGA's Memorandum of Law].
291. Id. at 7.
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PGA's argument attempting to create zones of access on a golf course where the
ADA does not apply.292 The USGA goes on to argue that "[w]hat makes the
U.S. Open Championship non-public is the presence of criteria which by their
very nature exclude all but a minuscule portion of the general public. '293 This
also mirrors the PGA's argument with regard to its membership which was
dismissed at the motion stage by the district court in Oregon. 294
Ignoring the Martin case's reasoning regarding fatigue and the essential
nature of golf, the USGA also repeated the argument that walking is a part of the
game of golf because "(i) [t]he use of the legs is a basic element in the proper
execution of a golf shot,"'295 "(ii) [t]here is a specific leg fatigue factor that is
affected by walking,"296 "(iii) [t]here also is a more general fatigue factor that is
affected by walking,"'29 7 and so in the end "[i]f you walk, you are more tired; if
you ride you are less tired."'29 8
In possibly the weakest of its arguments, the USGA argued that "[i]f a rule is
changed for only one competitor, an essential aspect of the competition - - i.e.,
uniform rules for all - - has been lost.., any accommodation in athletics
inevitably would produce some competitive advantage for a competitor. '299
Perhaps not surprisingly, Olinger won his motion and was allowed to use a cart
in the competition. 300 Unfortunately for Olinger, even with the use of a cart, he
did not qualify for the U.S. Open. 30 1 As of the date of this writing, no further
decision had been rendered in this case. A more sensitive look at the sports cases
referred to below shows that accommodating the disabled, possibly by modifying
some rules can be exactly what the ADA calls for.
IV. COMMON GROUND: THE ADA'S IMPACT ON THE
SPORTS WORLD
After the Casey Martin case, national news broadcasts, papers, and
magazines have speculated that the sports world will never be the same because
292. See supra p. 41.
293. USGA's Memorandum of Law, supra note 290, at 10.
294. See supra pp. 41-42.
295. USGA's Memorandum of Law, supra note 290, at 20.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 21.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
300. Ford Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, Order, Case No. 3:98CV252RM, 3 (N.D. Ind., May
15, 1998) &(May 18, 1998).
301. Cart Doesn't Help Olinger, AP, May 18, 1998 (visited May 30, 1998)
<http://www/golfweb.com/news/disabled980518.html>.
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sporting organizations are not free to set their own rules of participation.
Pictures have been painted of wheelchair bound athletes rounding first base or
wheeling-to the end zone.
This is most assuredly not the case. A careful reading of the cases discussed
in this article shows that the Casey Martin case turned on factors delineated in
the other sports cases and mandated by the ADA. Out of the Martin case and the
other cases discussed, several conclusions can be made.
A. Levels of Sport
The PGA Tour seemed to argue that because it regulated the elite,
professional level of golf, the cases dealing with lower levels of sport
(interscholastic, intercollegiate and amateur) did not apply to it, and, somehow,
the ADA should not apply to a membership organization at this high level. The
PGA even argued that other professional leagues (i.e. the NFL and NBA) had
been found not subject to the ADA, and so it also should be exempted from the
ADA's requirements.
Several clarifications show that the PGA's argument here is misguided.
Initially, the Stoutenborough and Cortez cases did not determine that the leagues
themselves were always exempt from the requirements of the ADA. What was
determined is that the NFL's television broadcasts were not services of the
public accommodation as regulated by the ADA and that the NBA did not own
or operate the Alamodome as required under the ADA. Any further conclusion,
then, that the leagues are always exempt from the ADA's requirements is not
warranted.
In reality, the PGA Tour may be lucky that the court did not determine that it
was an employer of Casey Martin, because as an employer it, and any other
professional sports organization, could face clear liability under Title I.
In the end, all sports organizations should pay heed to the Martin court when
it says that "the ADA does not distinguish between sports organizations and
other entities when it comes to applying the ADA to a specific situation." 302
The ADA deals with organizations that come under its requirements and
discriminate against the disabled. As is obvious from this article, sports
organizations receive no special protection from the strictures of the ADA.
B. Eligibility Rules vs. Rules of Play
The main distinction between sports cases and non-sports cases has to do
302. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1246.
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with the type of rule that is impacted in the particular situation. In all of the high
school and college cases, the rules contested were eligibility rules for actual
admittance to the particular sport or sporting organization. Such rules, if
justified by proper health and safety or other reasons, were usually upheld as
essential and fundamental to the nature of the athletic program. Therefore, they
could only be modified "reasonably." And, clearly, a modification that would
entirely defeat the rule would not be "reasonable."
The NCAA probably found itself in trouble because it already had
procedures in place which allowed for exemptions from its eligibility rules.
Moreover, even though the reasons for these rules are viable and reasonable,
even though the rules might be essential to the NCAA's regulation of college
athletics, and even though they denied eligibility to certain persons based on
independent criteria that did not take into account the unique status of the
disabled, these regulations could be modified. The eligibility rules themselves
were not invalid, but they could simply be reasonably modified.
The rules contested in the Casey Martin and Ford Olinger cases did not deal
with eligibility, even though the golf organizations attempted to frame them this
way. Of particular importance is the fact that nowhere in the Rules of Golf was
it written that a participant must walk. The rule against cart use seems more
geared to the actual playing of golf once one has met the other requirements of
eligibility. In these cases, however, two individuals alleged that they were not
even allowed to reach eligibility for play at first because their disabled status was
not accommodated. And as most golfers and the majority of golf courses
themselves allow for the use of a cart, allowing its use in these situations does
not seem "unreasonable."
The PGA and USGA are also incorrect in interpreting these decisions to
mean that they do not have the power to set eligibility rules and to regulate the
way in which golf is played within their organizations. If an eligibility rule
(which is written down) is enforced for legitimate reasons (as in the high school
cases), modifications of which would fundamentally alter the game, the rule
should be allowed. What is not allowed is nonessential rules or traditions which
bar a disabled individual from participating in golf if he or she meets the other
criteria as established by the organization.
Clearly, if either disabled golfer wanted to use the cart while shooting, the
game of golf would probably be changed significantly and fundamentally
enough that this modification would be unreasonable. The ADA does not force
such odd results; it merely forces organizations to accommodate the disabled in a
reasonable manner.
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C. Participation vs. Attendance
Fundamental to all of this analysis is the realization made in the KTS Brief
that "[t]he ADA was not intended solely to increase access for persons with
disabilities to attend places of public accommodation as spectators; it also speaks
to participation in public accommodations by persons with disabilities." 303
Both professional golf tours seem to have rested their arguments on the fact that
the public did attain access to the golf courses (the public accommodation itself),
even though the alleged "no-cart" rule they wanted enforced would not allow
certain disabled individuals to participate.
As the KTS Brief points out, the ADA is not merely a device for allowing
the disabled to enter the door and attain limited access to public facilities. The
ADA sets up specific methods by which the disabled are allowed to participate in
athletics (and in other areas) as long as their participation does not require more
than a "reasonable modification" to the "public accommodation," i.e. does not
require a fundamental alteration in the nature of the accommodation itself. Thus,
by focusing on the point of access, the tours, as other sporting organizations
discussed, miss the point of the ADA in the first place.
D. Reasonableness
It should be clear by now then that the failing in many of the arguments by
these sporting organizations in supporting their rules is in not understanding that
the core issue under the ADA is "reasonableness."
As mentioned by many of the courts, "[n]either the ADA nor... [the
Rehabilitation] Act mandates that an eligibility rule be eliminated as an
accommodation upon the assertion of disability on the part of an aspiring
player."304 Furthermore, "the ADA 'does not require [the sporting organization]
to simply abandon its eligibility requirements, but only to make reasonable
modifications to them.' 30 5 A modification is then unreasonable, "if it imposes
an 'undue financial and administrative burden' or requires a 'fundamental
alteration' in the nature of the privilege or program."306
This is the same for alleged rules of play as in the Martin and Olinger cases.
The courts did not merely force the PGA and USGA to abandon the "no-cart"
rules because the plaintiffs were disabled or because the golf organizations were
found to be amenable to the ADA; the courts actually forced the PGA and
303. KTS Brief, supra note 280, at 3.
304. Sikorski, supra note 37, at 7.
305. Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 466 (quoting Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, * 16).
306. Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *42 (citing Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930).
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USGA to abandon the rules with respect to these individuals because the use of a
cart was a "reasonable" modification in the particular situation.
If the PGA and USGA had not spent so much time dealing with the issue of
fairness and a level playing field, never admitting that these individuals could not
be on a level playing field as a result of the physical limitations caused by their
disabilities, they could have focused more on the "reasonableness" of the
accommodation and possibly attained a different result.
E. Custom & Practice
In dealing with cases in the sports context that actually concern rules of play,
and not merely eligibility rules, potential defendants can also look for help in
precedent dealing with sports torts.
In some sports tort cases, harmful actions outside of the rules of sport are
nevertheless protected if it can be proven that the conduct was part of the natural
"custom and practice" of playing the sport itself.3 07  Courts have given
deference to litigants who have demonstrated that beyond the written rules there
are rules of play that are just as powerful and just as essential and meaningful to
the sport.
In their arguments, neither the PGA Tour nor the USGA could present actual
rules (written or otherwise) that demonstrated that walking was a defined part of
the game of golf. It is possible, however, that for the game of golf, walking is
such an essential custom and practice that the PGA and USGA could have
provided sufficient evidence of this tradition to convince their respective courts
that allowing the use of a cart would cause a serious change in the fundamental
nature of golf.
This argument would not support removing either organization from
amenability under the ADA; instead, it would help support their arguments that
the modifications sought by Martin and Olinger were unreasonable.
V. CONCLUSION
Does the ADA Change the Rules of Sport? There is no blanket answer to
this question. The ADA usually will not modify eligibility rules which are
legitimate and essential modification of which would fundamentally alter the
nature of the sport. On the other hand, the ADA can alter the actual rules of play
307. For example, see Ray Yasser et al., Sports Law: Cases and Materials 673-700 (3rd ed. 1997).
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of a sport, if the modification itself is found to be reasonable.
It is hard to imagine a sport other than golf, however, where a result similar
to that of the Martin and Olinger cases would be appropriate. Many have
concluded that the ultimate result of the ADA in sports will be to so change the
way games are played that the sport itself will become unrecognizable. This is
not the case.
The ADA merely acts to fulfill its purpose, the integration of the disabled
into all aspects of American life. This purpose is then tempered at every step
with the realization that certain modifications to sports as to other areas can only
be undertaken if they are "reasonable."
If the sports world is to continue as a "reflection" of society, it must continue
to take the foreground in accommodating the disabled. This will not pervert
sports, and it will not change the games we love. It will instead present a sports
world where qualified, talented, dedicated, hard-working individuals can
participate with other similarly-skilled athletes. In the end, one can only hope
that this is the world that those in sports envision and will continue to strive for.
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